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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of
JAMES JOHN LATSIS (sometimes

I

Case No. 7954

known as '' Latses' '), Deceased.

STATEMENT
A short reply brief by respondents is required because new matters are presented in appellants' answer
brief; and, since there are no pleadings defining the
issues here is a large and involved probate record, more
confusion may arise.
I

Appellant's answer brief takes some scattered
shots at a few matters considered answerable, but it
ignores most of the fundamental matters raised by
the petitioners and by Amici Curiae. New matters are
argued without any reference to the order of the Court
appealed from, or to the grounds of our motion upon
which the Court's order was based.
We will follow their points I and II in the order
presented.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The equivocal claim is now made that the decree of
October 9, 1945, is ''either conditional or void as to
its distributive clause.''
This goes beyond what the op1n1on of this Court
said, and is a different point from any heretofore presented. This Court's opinion said the "decree of distribution and order of discharge * * * was conditional
* * *. '' This was because of a misunderstaning as to
the decree. The appellants, as pointed out in Mrs.
Latsis' petition (p. 8) had, in fact, complained in their
brief because the final decree did not adopt the conditions
which they claimed were in the stipulation and which
this Court's opinion said the final decree did adopt.
And while the Court's opinion did in effect destroy the
decree, it did not say, nor was this done, on the theory
that it was void because of anything within itself or in
the probate record here, or at all. So that if this theory
were now adopted, it would seemingly require a rehearing and argument on the point of voidness.
True, the appellants also made a statement in their
former brief which they now (p. 7) refer to and quote
and which statement is exactly contrary to their contention above referred to. This quote (p. 7) contains two
false statements by which this Court was n1isled. It
does, however, mention a sort of qualified "nullity."
Their petitions and assignments didn't present, and
their brief didn't argue the point now argued, nor can
2
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judgn1ents be vacated on off-hand assertions of disputed
facts made in a brief. Anyway, this reference is the
only basis claimed for bringing up this point now.
And then on the assumption that the decree is
absolutely void, authority is now cited that, ''A void
decree can be * * * attacked at any time.'' The assumption that it is void is supported by no authority, and
only two things are hinted at for this claim:
That Section 74-4-5 on ''Succession'' says
that under certain conditions the estate must be distributed to the heirs therein defined unless otherwise
"provided in this title or in the probate code, * * *." So
it is assumed that if any decree does not distribute the
estate or any of it to the heirs. entitled hereto, it is void
and can be vacated by petition at any time.
( 1)

The Amici Curiae brief (p. 5-12) cites several Utah
cases in which decrees of the lower Courts have failed
to distribute to the heirs entitled under this statute
and which decrees were nevertheless upheld by this Court
as not only not void and not subjct to collateral attack,
but subject only to direct attack within the statutory time
and for extrinsic fraud. The general rule to this effect is
also cited there, and other cases and authorities are cited
(p. 4-6) in the petition of Mrs. Latsis here. While the
matter was not presented so as to be required to be
directly and exhaustively briefed, these cases and
authorities completely refute appellants' claim that this
decree is void.
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Appellants mention only one of these cases, Tiller v.
Norton, 253 P. 2d 618. There the decree gave nothing to
two direct heirs, while here the degree gave these collateral heirs what the trial Court determined to be their share
of the estate. Appellants attempt to distinguish this
case by merely saying ''there is no analogy between the
Tiller case and this case. Here the Court lacks the power
to vary from the statutory rule of distribution and any
such variance constitutes a void judgment.'' If this
judgment is void because of variance from this statute,
then this Court has been wrong in all these prior decisions
cited, where there has been plain variance. This ipsedixitism is an easy, if somewhat arbitrary, disposal by appellants of the Tiller case and these other cases and authorities all holding contrary to this statement.
Since the second hint ·of a basis of clain1 that the
decree is void refers to the attorney appointment under
75-14-25, we will discuss this under their point II.

II.
This hint at voidness is supported (p. 6) by a quotation from one of their petitions. This is under the assertion that the "power and authority" for Mr. Cotro-Manes
to act on behalf of these heirs was challenged in thP
petition. Nothing in the quotation does challenge this
however. The petition filed more than seven years after
probate was commenced merely makes these three inrorrect assertions of fact :
4
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(a)

That appellants were unaware of the pendency
of these probate proceedings.

(b)

That they were not advised of such by their
attorney.

(c)

That he did not consult with them concerning
affairs of the estate.

On these irrelevant statements and the reference
(p. 4) to the fact that the decree refers to his appointment
and mentions the allowance ·of his fee and the amount to
be distributed to the heirs, it is claimed the decree is
void.
So, the contention comes to this: If the Court had
appointed no representative for these parties at all and
nothing had been done on their behalf, a final decree
of distribution which didn't give them what they claim
they are entitled to might be upheld; but because the
attorney was appointed and because he failed to advise
them as above recited, the final decree is void, and the
Court should now hold it void without proof of these
assertions. This not only would emasculate the statute
as to the appointment and representation of minors and
absent heirs, but would make it a menace to any final
decree if the trial Court did anything under it at all.
Point II repeats that an attorney appointed under
this section ''cannot compromise a claim without consent ·of the heir.''
In the first place, the attorney did not compromise
the claim, and this term has been repeatedly and wrong-
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fully used by appellants, and the Court has been misled
thereby. We have quoted (Banks's petition, p. 8) the
record which shows that on the hearing it was determined
that this was not a ''compromise'' at all, and the trial
Court made a finding and determination (R. 95) that
the amount fixed and distributed was the share of these
heirs.
In the second place, there is no good reason to believe, and certainly no authority has been cited, that the
attorney representing these heirs could not compromise at
least by agreeing on a division, if the Court approved.
Their claim is not compromised when all the heirs here,
including a brother, and the representative of the foreign
ones, ,consent to a division found by the Court to be correct.
In the third place, the statute plainly gives the
representative and the Court complete authority to act
for and bind these heirs in ''settlements, partitions and
distributions of estates." (See appellants' reply brief,
p. 2-3, for definition of" settlement without any notice.")
This is the very heart and purpose of this statute, and
no authority has been cited that they do not have this
power in this matter, and if they do not, the statute
is meaningless.
In the fourth place, if the Court and the attorney
both erred to appellants damage, it would not affect the
finality of this decree or make it void, and no authority
has been cited indicating that it would. The brief of
Amici Curiae shows this conclusively, and also (p. 13-14)

6
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establishes that there can't be asserted as "'conditions"
something a "party is bound" to do, as are appellants
here.
It is asserted that our statute was taken verbatim
from California. This is not literally true, hut as to the
portions of the statue here involved, the statutes are
identical. But the statement that this statute has ever
been construed by the Courts of California in respect to
the power of dealing with "settlements, partitions and
distributions'' here involved, is completely false. This
was refuted in the answer brief of respondents at pages
5 and 6 wliere it was shown that all these California
cases related to things entirely foreign to the matters here
involved. The two cases which it is claimed interpreted
this statute before Utah enacted it, interpreted nothing
under consideration here, and nothing that is in our
statute at all.
The first case related only to an appointed attorney's
authority to withdraw a pending action brought to contest
a will. The second related only to fees of an appointed
attorney holding that he could recover such, but that he
claimed too much.
The Lux case quoted from in the opinion indicates that their statute had then been amended at different times so that there is no indication that this statute
was in effect when these first two cases were decided.
This Lux case also related solely to fees, and, in addition
to holding that a Court appointed attorney could be
replaced by an attorney of an adult heir's own selection,

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

said that fees were claimed (60 P. at 32) for services
rendered "almost two years before the appointment was
made" and that the Court could not fix the amount of fees
before any services had been rendered or appraised. That
is all.
The Court, then apparently incensed at the exorbitant claim of the appointed attorney, who "had already
received $93,000, '' said in the dicta quoted in the opinion
of the Court here that the Court could do nothing
with this statute that it couldn't do without it, which,
if so as to fees, is not so as to the authority conferred by
the statute; but even in the speculative illustrations there
made, and here quoted, the authority expressly given by
our statute and exercised, is not referred to. It was
said that the Court couldn't give the appointed attorney
authority ''to bind a person who is sui juris to waive his
rights, or concede claims against him, or to institute
proceedings for him or to incur costs chargeable to him.''
Here, the Court didn't do, and the attorney didn't
attempt to do, any of these. There is in fact no justification for giving this Lux case the unwarranted application given it, or any application, to the case at bar.
We can't get away from the fact that the Court
determined what appellants' rights were here; nobody
waived them. The objection is to the correctness of that
determination and distribution, for if they received their
share they can't complain, and even if both the attorney
and the Court had erred as to that determination, this
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final judg1:nent would certainly not thereby be rendered
void.

Respectfully submitted,
MOSS & HYDE,
Attorneys for Petitioner,
Virginia Latsis Zambukos

MULLINER, PRINCE &
MULLINER,
Attorneys for Petitioner,
Utah Savings & Trust Company

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

